Fifteen years ago I slept on the ground in the Puerta del Sol because I could not see a better future in Spain, and we wrote that on cardboard. In 2012 I left. This autumn a new generation slept in the same square. The Acampada 26S held Sol from 26 September until 3 November, when police removed 334 people and the protest moved out to the neighbourhoods. Valencia’s camp, 600 tents at its peak, packed up yesterday, the day after a general strike for housing.
The politics moved faster than the tents. On 2 October Congress voted down both of the government’s housing decrees, the fourth and fifth to die that year. Three days later Pedro Sánchez called a general election for 29 November. The government reissued the decrees, and on Thursday the Diputación Permanente kept one alive by 35 votes to 34 and killed the other, the one that would have extended rental contracts automatically. The campaign starts today.
This piece started at a friend’s wedding, in an argument with my friend Juan. He had looked into all of this more deeply than anyone I know, and we argued about it for a very long time. It was one of the most productive arguments I have had about Spain, and we ended it agreeing on one thing, which is also the thesis of what follows: nobody in Spain is really on the side of the young.
Every party in that chamber agrees on one thing, even when it agrees on nothing else. The future of Spain is its pensioners. Pensions get revalued, pensioners get courted, and nobody who wants to win an election votes against them.
Read that sentence again. The future of a country is, by definition, the people who will still be alive to live in it. A country that organises its economy around protecting the incomes and assets of the people with the least future left is not planning for its future. It is spending it.
Two pension systems
Spain runs two pension systems. The first is the one with the name. Workers contribute, retirees collect, and the transfer sits in the state budget where anyone can read it. Someone retiring this year starts on an average of €1,707 a month. That system was paid into, it is honest about what it does, and I have no quarrel with it.
The second system has no name, no budget line and no parliamentary debate. It is the housing market, and you do not need to take my word for what it is. Take the landlords’. A study by Alquiler Seguro, a rental management company, built on INE household budget data, found that 44.4% of Spanish landlords are over 65, another 37.9% are between 50 and 64, and just 1.2% are under 35. Public pensions are the main income of 46.6% of the households that rent out a home, and the most common reason they give for renting is to complement the pension.
The industry published those numbers to defend the small landlord. Read them again and they describe a pension scheme. Contributions flow in monthly from the working young. Benefits flow out to the retired and the nearly retired. Only 4.9% of the population receives rental income, while 20.8% lives in a rented home. Nobody voted on the contribution rate. A market short of homes set it.
The contribution rate
Here is what the contributors earn. Adjusted for inflation, the average Spanish wage was €32,157 in 1994 and €33,044 in 2024, OECD figures. That is €887 in thirty years, less than €75 a month, about eleven times slower than the OECD average.
Here is what the assets cost. In 1995 the average Spanish home cost around €55,000 against an average gross salary of €14,500, a little under four years of pay. Today it takes more than seven. The national average has passed €3,089 per square metre, and in the parts of Madrid where the jobs are, more than €5,000. A basic flat in a city with work costs more than €300,000. Much of the generation that owns those flats bought them for three paper clips and a chocolate bar.
The result is the sharpest generational break in the Bank of Spain’s household survey. In 2002, 66% of households headed by someone under 35 owned their home. By 2022 it was 32%. Millennials in their late thirties and early forties have slid from 78% to 56%. Households headed by someone over 74 own their home 83.4% of the time.
And when you cannot buy or rent, you stay put. Young Spaniards leave home at 30.2 on average, almost four years later than the EU average of 26.3. In Finland, where I have lived since 2012, they leave at 21.3. That is nine years of adult life spent in a childhood bedroom, inside the same single market.
Reading the numbers honestly
A piece like this lives or dies on whether its numbers survive a hostile reader, so here are the places where they need care.
The most quoted figure in this debate is that rent consumes 98.7% of a young person’s salary. It is real, but read what it measures: the average rent of a whole flat against the average young wage. Almost nobody pays that ratio, because almost nobody can. The young either share or stay home. The 98.7% is not a description of what the young pay. It is a description of the door that is closed to them, and the emancipation age is the queue outside it.
The best objection from the other side is that the boomers suffered too. Mortgage rates stood at 17.05% in January 1991, and in 1995 a mortgage payment ate around 40% of a gross salary, against about 31% today. On the monthly measure, buying has got easier. That is true, and it is the wrong measure. A payment is a flow. A price is a stock. High rates on a cheap house hurt for a few years, and then inflation and wage growth ate the debt while the asset kept climbing. A high price hurts before you start, because you need a deposit worth years of savings before any bank will lend. And the comparison flatters the past for a simpler reason: today’s thirty-year-old is not choosing between a 3% mortgage and a 17% one. They are paying rent, and rent buys nothing.
The monthly payment is lower for a second reason, and it is not a kind one. The loan is longer. The average new home mortgage in Spain now runs for 26 years, on an average loan of €180,785. On its own, that term is not unusual: the country reports in the European Mortgage Federation’s annual review mostly describe typical terms of 20 to 30 years, so Spain sits in the European middle. What is unusual is everything around it. Spaniards leave home at 30 and then need years to save a deposit, so a buyer who signs at 35 finishes paying at 61. And a second-hand home carries a transfer tax of 6% in Madrid and 10% in Catalonia or Valencia, before notary and registry fees, paid again every time you sell one home to buy another.
Put those together and a mortgage stops being a loan and becomes an anchor. A young buyer commits a quarter century of income to one asset in one city, with a tax of up to a tenth of its value standing between them and the next job somewhere else. The Bank of Spain’s then governor listed reduced labour mobility, especially among the young, among the costs of the housing squeeze. Research published by the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales finds that owners’ higher transaction costs lead them to give up on distant job offers, or never look for them, in a country with one of the lowest rates of internal migration in the OECD. The same research is honest about the other side: mortgaged owners accept lower wages, which offsets part of the damage to their chances of finding work. That is hardly a comfort. The mortgage keeps you employed by making you cheaper. And every euro that goes into 26 years of repayments is a euro not saved, not invested and not put into starting something. The boomers’ wealth sits in a flat they bought young and cheap. The young buyer’s sits in a flat bought late and dear, in one city, behind a tax wall.
The landlord numbers need the same care. The Alquiler Seguro study says 93.4% of landlords own a single rental. EsadeEcPol, working from tax data, finds that 52.8% of the rental homes owned by individuals sit with people who rent out two or more, rising to 56.4% in Madrid and 60.8% in Barcelona. Both can be true. One counts owners, the other counts flats. Funds and companies hold only about 8% of the private rental market. Spain’s rental market is not owned by Wall Street. It is owned by a generation.
Then the shortage itself. The Bank of Spain counts about 240,000 new households in 2025 against 91,896 homes completed, and a deficit near 750,000. A group at the Polytechnic University of Catalonia disputes that there is any serious deficit, pointing to the overbuilding of the last decade and the stock of empty homes. Both sides are counting correctly. They are counting different things. The national stock is large. The stock within commuting distance of the jobs is not, and a young person in Madrid cannot rent an empty house in rural Ourense.
Last, be suspicious of the numbers that arrive with a campaign. When the decrees were announced, the listings portal idealista reported that 19% of available rental supply vanished in a month. Maybe. But a listing is not a home, and an advert pulled from a portal is not a flat demolished. Treat both sides’ instant statistics as weather, not climate.
The state’s thumb on the scale
Scarcity explains why rents rise. It does not explain why the state makes rent the best-treated income in the country.
A young worker pays income tax on their salary with no special discount for having earned it. A landlord gets one. In 2024, Spanish landlords declared €21 billion in rent from people’s main homes. After deducting expenses, they applied a reduction that knocks at least half off the net income, simply for renting out a home, and ended up paying tax on about €5 billion. Of every €100 in rent, €24 is taxed. The reduction alone was worth €6.6 billion in a single year. The thirty-year-old’s wage is taxed in full so that the rent they pay out of it can be taxed at a quarter.
Then the asset passes on. Madrid, Andalusia, Galicia and several other regions apply a 99% bonus on inheritance tax for children and spouses, and Madrid has done so since 2007. So the second pension does not end with the pensioner. It becomes an inheritance, almost untaxed, and the young split into two classes that have nothing to do with what they studied or how hard they work. One class will inherit flats. The other will spend its working life paying rent to the first.
That is what “the future of Spain is its pensioners” means in practice. The future has already been allocated, by surname.
What the parties are promising, and whether it will work
Programmes are still landing. The PP published its programme on 10 November and Vox on 12 November; the PSOE presents its own on 15 November, so its column below rests on what it has done in government and announced so far.
The PP calls housing the first problem of Spaniards and promises a million homes in four years, a new Land Law, the repeal of the Housing Law with its rent-controlled zones, and for under-40s 4% VAT on a first home, a public guarantee for up to 20% of its value and a tax-deductible “Hucha Hogar Joven” savings account. The diagnosis is right: Spain needs more homes. The number is not credible. A million in four years is 250,000 a year, nearly three times what Spain finished in 2025, and the Bank of Spain names land, slow planning and a shortage of construction workers as the binding limits. None of those moves because a manifesto says so. The demand side is worse. A VAT cut and a public guarantee for buyers put more money into the hands of people bidding for a fixed number of flats, and the seller pockets much of it. Spain has run this experiment: one Complutense study estimated the old home-purchase deduction left prices 27% to 36% higher by 2007 than they would otherwise have been. The evidence is not unanimous. A Bank of Spain study found that scrapping the deduction in 2011 shrank new mortgages by about 6% with no measurable price effect, but that was in a market already falling. In one where 240,000 households chase 92,000 homes, the seller has the leverage. And the seller, statistically, is the second pension.
The PSOE bets on public housing: a state housing company, permanent protection for subsidised homes and a public stock above 6% of the total, funded through a 2026 to 2030 state plan worth €7 billion. Permanent protection is the single best idea on any ballot, because it plugs the hole through which Spain spent decades building subsidised homes and then letting them slide into the private market. It is also what the Sol campers asked for in their farewell manifesto: that no home built with public money should ever return to private hands. But look at the scale. €7 billion over five years is €1.4 billion a year. The landlord tax reduction cost €6.6 billion in 2024 alone. The state forgoes almost five times more each year subsidising the second pension than it plans to spend building the alternative. And the decree that survived on Thursday includes interest-free loans of up to €50,000 for the deposit on a first home, which is the same demand-side subsidy as the PP’s, in a different colour.
Vox wants to liberalise land, cut taxes on purchases, bring back the home-purchase deduction and give “national priority” in social housing and rent aid. Land liberalisation addresses a real constraint. The deduction is the policy the Complutense study blamed for inflating the last bubble. And national priority does not build a single home. It reorders a queue that is too long, and tells the young Spaniard at the back that the problem is the person in front of them rather than the price at the door.
Sumar’s successor, the Frente Amplio, wants to spend 1% of GDP a year on public housing and ban companies and investment funds from buying homes. The first number is the right order of magnitude, more than twice what the landlord reduction costs, and the only pledge on the ballot sized to the problem. The ban aims at the wrong target. Funds hold around 8% of the private rental market. The other 92% belongs to individuals, and most of them vote.
Podemos puts regulating rents first among its first-year priorities and wants to expropriate the use of homes held by large owners and funds. Price caps help the people who already have a contract and hurt the people looking for one, because a landlord facing a capped rent picks the safest tenant, and the safest tenant is never the 24-year-old on a temporary contract. Expropriation runs into the same wall as the fund ban: the big owners are not where the stock is.
Put the programmes side by side and a pattern appears that no single debate will show you. The right subsidises buyers, which raises what sellers receive. The centre-left subsidises buyers too, and builds public housing at a fraction of what it spends on landlords. The left targets funds and corporations that hold a small slice of the market. Not one programme I have read proposes ending the tax reduction on rental income or the inheritance bonuses on second homes. The second pension has the broadest coalition in Spanish politics. It is so broad that nobody has to defend it out loud.
Juan and I left that wedding agreeing that nobody in Spain is really on the side of the young. Read the programmes and it is hard to argue otherwise.
What would actually work
I am not proposing to touch the first pension. People paid into it, and it does what it says. I am proposing to stop subsidising the second one.
Tax rent like work. Abolish the reduction on rental income. A euro earned from owning a flat should not be taxed more gently than a euro earned from working in one. That is €6.6 billion a year. Put all of it into public rental housing with permanent protection, rented at prices tied to wages and never sold. At a back-of-envelope €150,000 a home, that is more than 40,000 homes a year. Landlords will say rents will rise. Rents are already set by scarcity, not by the landlord’s tax bill, and the cure for scarcity is homes.
Tax inherited rental portfolios. Keep the family home out of it. Children who inherit the flat they grew up in should not be punished. But a 99% bonus on the second, third or fourth flat is a policy for turning one generation’s windfall into the next generation’s rent roll. End the bonus beyond the main residence and send the money to the same fund.
Stop subsidising buyers. Every VAT cut, guarantee and zero-interest deposit loan on this ballot hands money to people bidding against each other for homes that do not exist. Redirect it to building them.
None of this needs a new ministry or a five-year plan. It needs a parliament willing to tell its most reliable voters that their assets are not the future of the country. That is exactly why, on 29 November, nobody will be offering it.
In 2011 we wrote on our cardboard that Spain had no future for us. We were wrong about that. The future existed. It had just already been bought, at 1990s prices, and was being rented back to us by the month.